Abstract. The well-known forking lemma by Pointcheval and Stern has been used to prove the security of the so-called generic signature schemes. These signature schemes are obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform from three-pass identification schemes. A number of five-pass identification protocols have been proposed in the last few years. Extending the forking lemma and the Fiat-Shamir transform would allow to obtain new signature schemes since, unfortunately, these newly proposed schemes fall outside the original framework. In this paper, we provide an extension of the forking lemma in order to assess the security of what we call n-generic signature schemes. These include signature schemes that are derived from certain (2n + 1)-pass identification schemes. We thus obtain a generic methodology for proving the security of a number of signature schemes derived from recently published five-pass identification protocols, and potentially for (2n + 1)-pass identification schemes to come.
Introduction
The focus of this work is on methodologies to prove the security of digital signature schemes. Thus, instead of providing security reductions from scratch, the goal is to provide security arguments for a class of signature schemes, as previously done in [12, 13, 9, 1, 19] . In particular, we aim at extending a pioneering work by Pointcheval and Stern [12] where a reduction technique was introduced to obtain security arguments for the so-called generic signature schemes. These security arguments allow for simple proofs and for efficient signature schemes. Moreover, this type of signature schemes can be derived from identification schemes if the latter satisfy certain requirements.
Generic Signature Schemes. Pointcheval and Stern call generic signature schemes those whose signatures are of the form σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , σ 1 ), where σ 0 is uniformly distributed over a large set, h 1 = H(m, σ 0 ) with H being a hash function modeled as a random oracle, m is the message to be signed and σ 1 depends just on σ 0 and h 1 .
The works [12, 13] provide security arguments for generic signature schemes thanks to the use of the forking lemma. This lemma states that a successful forger can be restarted with a different random oracle in order to get two distinct but related forgeries. If the generic signature schemes additionally enjoy the existence of a polynomial-time algorithm, called extractor, that recovers the signing key from two signatures σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , σ 1 ) and σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , σ 1 ) with h 1 = h 1 , then unforgeability is guaranteed under a supposedly intractable problem.
Unfortunately, the forking lemma is restricted to 3-tupled signatures. One would like to obtain an unbounded version of this lemma for signatures of the form (σ 0 , h 1 , σ 1 , . . . , h n , σ n ) where h i = H i (m, σ 0 , h 1 , σ 1 , . . . , h i−1 , σ i−1 ) for n ∈ N. This would allow to address a greater class of signatures. In this work, we provide such an extension and apply it to assess the security of n-generic signature schemes. Roughly speaking, n-generic signature schemes are built as generic signature schemes but are not restricted in the number of tuple entries as mentioned above.
From Identification Schemes to Signature Schemes. One of the ways to build a signature scheme is to depart from an existing identification protocol and convert it into a signature scheme using the well-known Fiat-Shamir (FS) paradigm [5] .
In an identification protocol a series of messages are exchanged between two parties, called prover and verifier, in order to enable a prover to convince a verifier that it knows a given secret. Zero-knowledge identification protocols [7] convince a verifier without revealing any other information whatsoever about the secret itself. Informally, the FS paradigm builds a signature scheme as the transcript of one execution of the identification scheme, where the challenges sent by the verifier are replaced by the output of a secure hash function having as input the message and the current transcript.
In [12] the signatures obtained by applying the FS transform to canonical identification schemes were generalized to the concept of generic signatures schemes. Schematically, in a canonical identification scheme a prover sends first a commitment Com, then receives a challenge Ch drawn from a uniform distribution, and finishes the interaction with a message, called response Rsp. Finally, the verifier applies a verifying algorithm to the prover's public key, determining acceptance or rejection. In addition, the identification protocol needs to satisfy special-soundness. Roughly, special-soundness means there exists a polynomialtime algorithm which is able to extract the witness of the prover, given two correlated transcripts (Com, Ch, Rsp), (Com , Ch , Rsp ) with Com = Com and Ch = Ch .
Many zero-knowledge identification schemes have been proposed whose conversion to signature schemes lead to generic signature schemes like [5, 6, 17] . However, several signature schemes which are derived from 5-pass identification protocols are not covered by the abstraction above. Thus, we are obliged to prove their security from scratch. Examples of schemes falling outside the Pointcheval-Stern framework can be found in [3, 16, 17, 4, 10, 11, 15, 8, 18] . The authors must provide direct proofs for the signature schemes in these works deriving from 5-pass identification. These proofs often appear quite complex. Moreover, the authors of [14] recently left open to find a security reduction for signatures derived from a 5-pass identification protocol. We show that all aforementioned 5-pass identification schemes give raise to 2-generic signature schemes. We isolate a property, called n-soundness, that implies unforgeability of all the schemes satisfying it. Informally, n-soundness means that the signing key can be extracted from two correlated valid signatures σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) and σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) with h n = h n . In particular, we prove in Section 4 the security of the resulting signature scheme from [14] , which was missing in the original paper.
Related Work. Pointcheval and Stern [12, 13] provided security arguments for generic signature schemes. However, these generic signature schemes are restrictive in the sense that (a) they allow transformations only based on canonical identification schemes, and (b) there exists an extractor for these schemes. The work of Abdalla et al. [1] introduced a new transformation from identification schemes (IS) to signature schemes (SS) without insisting on the existence of such an extractor. Nonetheless, they require again canonical IS. Ohta and Okamoto [9] assume that the IS is honest-verifier (perfect) zero-knowledge and that it is computationally infeasible for a cheating prover to convince the verifier to accept. Again, this result is valid only for three-pass IS.
Very recently, Yao and Zhao [19] presented what they call challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm. Here, security results are set for three-pass IS with divided random challenges. Even though they consider more challenges, still identification schemes with more than three interactions are not captured by their paradigm. In this work, we consider an unlimited number of challenges as long as they are randomly chosen from large enough sets. To the best of our knowledge this is the first transformation which gives generic security statements for SS derived from (2n + 1)-pass IS.
Organization. We introduce in Section 2 the necessary background to understand the paper. In Section 3 we present the notion of n-generic signature schemes and provide an extended forking lemma that applies to this new signature type. We exemplify in Section 4 our paradigm and derive a provably secure 2-generic signature scheme based on multivariate polynomials.
Preliminaries
We begin by introducing some notations and briefly reviewing some definitions. A function μ(·) is negligible in n, or just negligible, if for every positive polynomial p(·) and all sufficiently large n it holds that μ(n) < 1/p(n). Otherwise, we call μ(·) non-negligible. Note that the sum of two negligible functions (resp. non-negligible) is again negligible (resp. non-negligible) whereas the sum of one non-negligible function π(·) and one negligible function μ(·) is non-negligible, i.e. there exists a positive polynomial p(·) such that for infinitely many n's it holds that π(n) + μ(n) > 1/p(n).
Two distributions ensembles {X n } n∈N and {Y n } n∈N are said to be (computationally) indistinguishable, if for every non-uniform polynomial-time algorithm D, there exists a negligible function μ(·) such that
We write s We require correctness of the verification, i.e., the verifier will always accept genuine signatures. More formally, for all (sk, pk) ← KGen(1 κ ), any message m, any σ ← Sign(sk, m), we always have Vf(pk, m, σ) = 1.
From signature schemes we require that no outsider should be able to forge a signer's signature. The following definition captures this property formally.
Definition 2 (Unforgeability of a Signature Scheme).
A signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign, Vf) is existentially unforgeable under (adaptively) chosenmessage attacks if for any efficient algorithm A making at most q s oracle queries, the probability that the following experiment returns 1 is negligible:
Vf(pk, m * , σ * ) = 1 and m * was not queried to Sign (·) by A The probability is taken over all coin tosses of KGen, Sign, and A.
Note that q s is bounded by a polynomial in the security parameter κ. Definition 2 captures unforgeability against adaptively chosen-message attacks for signature schemes. Unforgeability against no-message attacks is defined analogously but q s must be 0.
Splitting Lemma. The following lemma is extensively used in the forking lemma proofs. It states that one can split a given set X into two subsets, (a) a nonnegligible subset Ω consisting of "good" x's which provides a non-negligible probability of success over y, and (b) its complement, consisting of "bad" x's.
Lemma 1 (Splitting Lemma [12, Lemma 3]). Let
See [12, Lemma 3] for the proof.
Extended Security Arguments for Digital Signatures
In this section we give the formal definition of an n-generic signature scheme and extend the forking lemma accordingly. This allows us to prove that any n-generic signature scheme satisfying what we call n-soundness is existentially unforgeable in the random oracle model.
n-Generic Signature Schemes
Let H i denote a hash function with output of cardinality 2 κi (derived from the security parameter κ).
Definition 3 (n-Generic Signature Scheme
). An n-generic signature scheme is a digital signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign, Vf) with the following properties:
where 
Notice that the structure of a generic signature as originally proposed in [12] matches that of a 1-generic signature. For the sake of simplicity we occasionally
An Extended Forking Lemma
Pointcheval and Stern introduced in [12] the forking lemma as a technique to prove the security of some families of signature schemes, namely generic signature schemes with special-soundness. This well-known lemma is applied to get two forgeries for the same message using a replay attack, after that, one can use the two obtained forgeries to recover the secret key. They also show that a successful forger in the adaptive chosen-message attack model implies a successful forger in the no-message attack model, as long as the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property holds. In the following we propose an extension of the original forking lemma that applies to n-generic signature schemes. We first provide the Extended Forking Lemma in the no-message attack model. 
No-Message Attack
. Furthermore, we denote by E the event that A can produce a valid signature (σ 0 , . . . , σ n , h 1 , . . . , h n ) for message m by using random tape ω and the answers r
By hypothesis of the lemma, the probability that event E occurs (Pr[ E]), is nonnegligible, i.e., there exists a polynomial function
Furthermore, we get
because the output of O n is unpredictable. The event E implies that
, and thus we get
Relations (1) and (2) lead to
Note that a polynomial T (·) must exist since the difference between a nonnegligible and negligible term is non-negligible. Therefore, ∃l ≤ q n so that
.
Indeed, if we suppose that, ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , q n },
This leads to a contradiction with (3). Further, we define
, by using the splitting lemma we have:
, where the probability is taken over S
Recall that r (i) = (r
by using the splitting lemma again we get
, where the probability is taken over S qn−l+1 n .
As a result, if we choose l, ω, (r (1) , . . . , r (n−1) , (r
qn ), and (r
qn ) randomly, then we obtain two valid signatures (σ 0 , . . . , σ n , h 1 , . . . , h n ) and (σ 0 , . . . , σ n , h 1 , . . . , h n ) for message m with a nonnegligible probability such that h n = h n . 
Chosen-Message Attack Model
We now provide the Extended Forking Lemma in the adaptively chosen-message attack model. In this model, an adversary may adaptively invoke a signing oracle and is successful if it manages to compute a signature on a new message. If the signing oracle outputs signatures which are indistinguishable from a genuine signer without knowing the signing key, then using the simulator one can obtain two distinct signatures with a suitable relation from a single signature, similarly to the no-message scenario. Proof. We consider a PPT algorithm B that executes A in such a way that B simulates the environment of A. Therefore, B must simulate the interactions of A with random oracles O 1 , . . . , O n and with the real signer. Then, we could see B as an algorithm performing a no-message attack against the signature scheme S.
Theorem 1 (The Chosen-Message Extended Forking Lemma
Let Sim denote the zero-knowledge simulator of S that can simulate the answers of the real signer without knowledge of the secret key and has access to the random oracles O i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Let A be an adaptively chosen-message adversary, which is a probabilistic polynomial time Turing machine with a random tape ω taken from a set R ω . During the attack, A may ask q 1 , . The simulator Sim answers a tuple (σ
n ) as a signature for a message m (j) , for each integer j with 1 ≤ j ≤ q s . Then, the adversary A assumes that h
i−1 ) holds for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 1 ≤ j ≤ q s , and stores all these relations. Now we need to consider potential "collisions" of queries in the random oracles. There are two kind of collisions that can appear. That is, (a) the simulator Sim queries the random oracle with the same input the adversary has asked before (let us denote this event by E 1 ), and (b) Sim asks the same question repeatedly (let us denote this event by E 2 ).
We show that the probabilities of such events are negligible.
which is negligible, assuming that the σ i 's are random values drawn from a large set with cardinality greater than 2 κ . Moreover, we have
which is also negligible.
Algorithm B succeeds whenever the machine A produces a valid signature without any collisions. Hence, we have
which is non-negligible. Summing up, we have an algorithm B that performs a no-message attack against the signature scheme S in polynomial time with non-negligible probability of success. So we can use Lemma 2 applied to algorithm B, and we will obtain two valid signatures for the same message, such that h n = h n again in polynomial time.
Security of n-Generic Signature Schemes
Similar to generic signature schemes defined by Pointcheval and Stern [12] , for security under chosen-message attacks we require from n-generic signature schemes a property which we call n-soundness. Informally, n-soundness means that the secret key can be extracted from two correlated valid signatures σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) and σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) with h n = h n in polynomial-time and with a non-negligible probability. The notion of specialsoundness 2 and n-soundness coincide if n = 1.
Definition 4 (n-Soundness).
Let S = (KGen, Sign, Vf) be an n-generic signature scheme. We call S n-sound if there exists a PPT algorithm K, the knowledge extractor, such that for any κ and m, any (sk, pk) ← KGen(1 κ ), any σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) and σ = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) with Vf(pk, m, σ) = Vf(pk, m, σ ) = 1 and h n = h n , we have sk ← K(pk, σ, σ ) with non-negligible probability.
The following theorem states that all n-generic signature schemes satisfying nsoundness are existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attacks in the random oracle model.
Theorem 2 (Security of n-Generic Signature Schemes).
Let S be an ngeneric signature scheme satisfying n-soundness with underlying hard problem P. Let κ be the security parameter. Then, S is existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attacks.
Proof. We assume that the underlying hardness P of the n-generic signature scheme is hard, i.e., for all PPT algorithms A the probability to solve a hard instance of P is negligible. The key generation algorithm KGen of S outputs a secret and public key pair (sk, pk) derived by a hard instance and its corresponding solution of the problem P. Now, assume by contradiction, that S is not existentially unforgeable under chosen-message attacks. That is, there exists a PPT algorithm B 1 such that B 1 is able to output a signature σ * = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) for a fresh message m * with non-negligible probability. Then, due to the Extended Forking Lemma, one can construct a PPT algorithm B 2 which outputs two correlated signatures σ * = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) and σ * * = (σ 0 , h 1 , . . . , σ n−1 , h n , σ n ) with nonnegligible probability such that h n = h n .
Due to the n-soundness of S, we know that there exists an "extractor" which extracts the secret key given the two signatures above. This contradicts with the assumption that the underlying problem P is hard, and by implication, we learn that there cannot exist such a successful forger B 1 .
Applications
In this section we first discuss a transformation from (2n + 1)-pass identification protocols with a special structure to signature schemes that in many cases yields n-generic signature schemes. This is essentially an extended Fiat-Shamir transform. Then we go on with a specific instance of the aforementioned transformation. We obtain a new signature scheme based on multivariate polynomials by applying our method to a five-pass identification scheme recently introduced in [14] .
n-Generic Signature Schemes Derived from Identification Schemes
Our goal is to enlarge the class of identification protocols to which the FiatShamir transformation can be applied. We identify a potential set of candidates that we name n-canonical identification schemes. By n-canonical identification we mean schemes secure with respect to impersonation against passive attacks, where the challenges are drawn from an uniform distribution and have 2n + 1 moves.
Definition 5 (n-canonical Identification Protocol).
An n-canonical identification scheme IS = (K, P, V) is a (2n + 1)-pass interactive protocol. K and P = (P 1 , . . . , P n+1 ) are PPT algorithms whereas V = (ChSet, Vf) with ChSet being a PPT algorithm and Vf a deterministic boolean algorithm. These algorithms are defined as follows:
upon input a security parameter 1 κ , outputs a secret and public key (sk, pk) and challenge spaces G 1 , . . . , G n with 1/|G i | negligible in 1 κ . P 1 (sk) upon input a secret key sk outputs the commitment R 1 .
. . , n, upon input a secret key sk and the current transcript R 1 , C 1 , . . . , R n , C n ) upon input a secret key sk and the current transcript R 1 , C 1 , . . . , R n , C n , outputs a response Rsp. R 1 , C 1 , . . . , R n , C n , Rsp) upon input a public key pk, and the current transcript
ChSet(pk, i) upon input a public key pk and round number i, outputs a challenge
An n-canonical identification scheme IS has the following properties. For any index i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and any (sk, pk, G 1 , . . Note that the definition of 1-canonical identification schemes is identical to that of canonical identification schemes [1] . An extended Fiat-Shamir transform is applied to an n-canonical identification scheme and yields an n-generic signature scheme, just as the original Fiat-Shamir transform yields a generic signature scheme in [12] . The idea of this transformation consists on replacing the uniformly random challenges of the verifier as set by ChSet in the identification scheme by the outputs of some secure hash functions H i : {0, 1}
Public-Coin.
* → G i modeled as random oracles. More precisely, let IS = (K, P, V) be an n-canonical identification scheme. The joint execution of P(sk, pk) and V(pk) then defines an interactive protocol between the prover P and the verifier V. At the end of the protocol V outputs a decision bit b ∈ {0, 1}. An n-generic signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign, Vf) is derived as follows:
KGen(1 κ ) takes as input security parameter 1 κ and returns K(1 κ ). Sign(sk, m) takes as input a secret key sk and a message m and returns the transcript P(sk, pk), V(pk) as the signature σ, i.e.,
Here, C i is defined by the equation
. Vf(pk, m, σ) takes as input a public key pk, a message m and a signature σ and returns V.Vf(pk, m, σ) 3 as the decision bit.
The resulting scheme S is an n-generic signature scheme. Indeed, the obtained scheme S has the right structure and the honest-verifier zero-knowledge property is guaranteed by (the similar property of) the identification scheme. However, it is still not guaranteed that S is existentially unforgeable. It lacks then to check/prove that the resulting scheme S is n-sound. If this is the case then one can apply Theorem 2 and S is guaranteed to have security against adaptive chosen-message attacks.
Let us point out that the plain version of most identification protocols does not directly satisfy the required security level by their choice of challenges spaces G 1 , . . . , G n . In particular, it might be the case that 1/|G i | is not negligible in the security parameter 1 κ . For that reason, one should typically repeat the ID protocol several (say δ) times until the desired security level is reached. In that case the concatenation of δ transcripts P(sk, pk), V(pk) builds the signature (instead of a single execution of the ID scheme). Moreover, for our security analysis, we consider that the commitments R i in all contain more entropy than k n , the output size of the last hash function. This condition can be achieved by choosing their domain as large as necessary. Note that in [12] it is assumed that R 1 is uniformly distributed over its corresponding set.
Examples
Many zero-knowledge identification schemes have been proposed, whose conversion to signature schemes does not lead to generic signature schemes according to the definition of Pointcheval and Stern [12] . Examples of such schemes are those based on the Permuted Kernel Problem [15, 8] , the Permuted Perceptron Problem [10, 11] , the Constrained Linear Equations [18] , the five-pass variant of SD problem [17, 2] , the q-SD problem [4] , the SIS problem [3, 16] and the MQ-problem [14] . Fortunately, their conversion to signature schemes belong to the class of n-generic signature schemes. Unlike [10, 11] , they even satisfy nsoundness. Consequently, our result for security of n-generic signature schemes satisfying n-soundness carries over to the resulting signature schemes derived from all these aforementioned identification schemes in the random oracle model.
We provide next the security argument for the resulting signature scheme derived from the MQ-based identification scheme [14] . The conversion of all aforementioned identification schemes to n-generic signature schemes and its security can be formulated in a very similar fashion. For this reason, we omit these proofs here.
The (Five-Pass) MQ Identification Scheme [14] and Its Signature. Recently at Crypto 2011, Sakumoto et al. presented a five-pass public-key identification scheme based on multivariate quadratic polynomials [14] . Assuming the existence of a non-interactive commitment scheme Com which should be statistically hiding and computationally binding, the authors of [14] showed that their scheme is an honest-verifier zero-knowledge identification scheme whereas the n-soundness property is also verified as we will later see in the security analysis.
We first briefly describe the identification scheme [14] , following the procedure to convert it into a signature scheme using Section 4.1. Finally, we analyze the security of the obtained signature scheme using the Extended Forking Lemma discussed in Section 3.2.
Let n, m and q be positive integers. We denote by MQ(n, m, F q ) a family of functions
Let κ be a security parameter. Let n = n(κ), m = m(κ) and q = q(κ) be polynomially bounded functions. The key-generation algorithm K of this identification scheme can be described as follows. It takes 1 κ as input and creates a system parameter F ∈ MQ(n, m, F q ) which consists of an m-tuple of random multivariate quadratic polynomials. Then, it randomly chooses a vector s ∈ F n q (secret key), and computes the corresponding public key v := F (s). Finally, it returns the key pair (pk, sk) = (v, s). Figure 1 illustrates the interaction protocol between the prover and the verifier. The resulting Signature Scheme and its Security. According to Section 4.1, the MQ-based identification scheme described above can be turned to an n-generic signature scheme S = (KGen, Sign, Vf) as follows. Let δ be the number of rounds needed to achieve the required impersonation resistance. m, σ 0,i ),  -(t 1,i , e 1,i ) = (h 1,i r 0,i − t 0,i , h 1,i F (r 0,i ) − e 0,i ) and sets σ 1,i = (t 1,i , e 1,i ),  -h 2,i such that h 2,i = O 2 (m, σ 0,i , h 1,i , σ 1,i ),  -(σ 0,i , h 1,i , σ 1,i , h 2,i , σ Security Argument. Using the Extended Forking Lemma, we prove in the following that the signature scheme derived from the MQ-based zero-knowledge identification scheme is secure against adaptively chosen message attacks. We assume that an adversary produces a valid signature (σ 0 , h 1 , σ 1 , h 2 , σ 2 ) for a message m. By applying Theorem 1 we can find a second forgery (σ 0 , h 1 , σ 1 , h 2 , σ 2 ) with a non-negligible probability, such that h 2 = h 2 . That leads to the existence of an index i with 1 ≤ i ≤ δ, such that h 2,i = h 2,i . W.l.o.g. assume h 2,i = 0 and h 2,i = 1. Now, the adversary gets the answers for two distinct challenges, namely r 0,i and r 1,i . Finally, by adding the last two values, the secret key can be disclosed. This contradicts the intractability of the MQ problem.
